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David Konstan’s Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology, first published in 1973, quickly became a reference book for ancient Epicureanism studies. The present book is much more than a reprint. As the author advises us, the original text has been substantially revised, taking into account the numerous works which, in the last thirty years, have deeply changed our views upon its topics; so that «it preserves the original plan and idea, and yet is in many respects quite new, incorporating numerous supplementary passages and arguments that materially affect the exposition».
An original introduction deals with the nature of «passions». It is argued that Epicurus’ pathê exclusively consist in pleasure and pain, so that, like sensations (aistheseis), they reside in the non-rational part of the soul. It follows that we should consider that either joy (khara) or fear (phobos) are the proper terms standing for pleasure or pain at the level of the rational soul. DK’s exciting claim, then, is that the original theory of pathê entailing a strict distinction between rational and irrational state of mind is supposed, according to Epicurean view, to provide a solution to the ethical problem of the effectiveness of rational discourse against empty desires and irrational behaviours.
Analyzing Epicurean physical explanations of the soul in the light of ethical problems, (in full accordance with Epicurus’ proper view of philosophy), is characteristic of DK’s fruitful method in the first part of the book, the study of mental states, emotions and activities is connected with the definition of mental health and the understanding of the mechanism by which irrational fear is converted into irrational desire (e.g. the fear of death and of punishment after death inspires the urge to limitless acquisition of wealth and power). Chapter 2 discusses the interpretation of Epicurean ethics as a «primitivism» in close connection with the problem of the social-historical origin of empty desires and fears. Finally, after examining the nature of body and soul pleasure (Ch. 3), DK provides an atomistic interpretation of ataraxia as the immobility of the Sage’s soul which leads to the conclusion that «the ascription of divinity and immortality to the sage had a precise meaning for the Epicureans and was grounded in their physics and psychology».
A dense and acute analysis of key-questions of Epicurean psychological and moral philosophy gives DK the opportunity to raise a lot of current philosophical problems: theory of belief and of the motives of action; conscious and unconscious desires; possibility of a full materialistic explanation of the mind, etc. Accordingly, this book should be read with great profit, not only by scholars and specialists of ancient philosophy, but by anyone interested in an original reflection about these topics.
—Alain Gigandet
Université de Paris Est (Val de Marne)
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